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The emergence, spread, and transmutation of 
Boko Haram into one of the deadliest terror 
groups in the world has attracted global attention 
from policy makers, scholars, researchers and 
analysts. Between 2009 and 2015, Boko Haram 
claimed more than 20 000 lives; according to some 
accounts this figure could be as high as 100 000. 
In addition, the group has destroyed property 
worth billions of dollars. There is a growing body 
of literature on various aspects of its history, 
ideology, violent disposition and impact. Within 
this context, Alexander Thurston’s ground-
breaking work presents a uniquely insightful, 
analytical documentation of the trajectory of this 
militant group.
The book uses an impressive style, with 
polished language and covers a wide range of 
themes relating to Boko Haram. In addition to the 
introduction and conclusion, the book contains 
five main chapters as follows: (1) The Life world 
of Muhammad Yusuf; (2) Preaching Exclusivism, 
Playing Politics; (3) Chaos is Worse than Killings; 
(4) Total War in Northeastern Nigeria; and (5) Same 
War, New Actors. As informative as the chapter 
titles appear to be, they tell the reader much less 
about the topics covered in the book than the sub-
chapters. The book is rich in references with the 
“selected bibliography” covering 21 pages, from 
page 307 to 327. The references include books, 
articles, reports, documents from governments 
and military organizations, newspapers, online 
news resources, blogs, Jihadi videos and audio 
recordings. There are written Jihadi sources as well 
as videos, recordings and unpublished documents 
by Nigerian Salafis (non-Boko Haram). The author 
also conducted 11 interviews, all via Skype and 
telephone, apart from one possible exception.
The book, which is “not an ethnography, but 
a documentary history,” clarifies “how ideas 
and environments interacted to produce and 
sustain Boko Haram” (p.7). Its main theme is 
the “interaction between doctrine and events” 
(p.244) while its main thesis is that the Boko 
Haram violence “is largely driven by mutually 
reinforcing interactions between religious trends, 
including Boko Haram’s initial worldview, and its 
political environment” (p.300). It follows events 
chronologically, documents facts, covers details 
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and analyses many of the important milestones in 
the history of Boko Haram.
Despite the book’s richness, however, some 
of the issues discussed, which touch on the 
book’s fundamental premise, require further 
investigation and discussion. This review focuses 
on only two such issues. The first of these is the 
relationship between Muhammad Yusuf and 
Shaykh Ja’far Mamoud Adam; here, this reviewer 
believes that the author needs to do more towards 
gaining a better understanding of the real issues 
involved. Secondly, there is a lacuna in the entire 
analysis of the book, which is the neglect of 
Muhammad Yusuf’s history of active participation 
in the radical Muslim Brotherhood of Ibrahim 
El-Zakzaky and the possible influence of that 
movement on Yusuf’s thoughts and career. 
As far as the first issue is concerned, the author 
shows that Yusuf embraced Boko Haram through 
the “mentorship” of Ja’far Mahmoud Adam. The 
author struggles to defend this thesis throughout 
the book, claiming further that Yusuf was “a key 
protégé of Ja’far Adam: as such he was even Adam’s 
main representative in Maiduguri’s Muhammad 
Indimi Mosque” (p.84); however, the author 
does not cite any source. Here, it seems as if the 
author has been influenced by Andrea Brigaglia’s 
“conjecture”1 which, in an eccentrically unscientific 
way, tries to portray Ja’far as Yusuf’s coach on Boko 
Haram; it appears that Thurston has unquestionably 
approved this. However, this thesis is problematic 
for a number of reasons including the fact that it 
is built on “conjectures,” unsubstantiated and far-
fetched “hypotheses,”2 and often unsubstantiated 
claims that can easily be debunked with a little 
investigation. A misleading claim which Thurston 
himself has cited is the one by Khalifa Aliyu Ahmed 
Abulfathi, a Sufi detractor of Ja’far, on the role of 
Muhammad Yusuf at the Indimi Mosque. Abulfathi 
reports that “Adam once raised the hands of 
[Muhammad] Yusuf and said, ‘if today there are 
no more scholars in Borno, this man is sufficient 
for you as an Islamic guide’” (pp.85-6). A statement 
of this kind needs to be thoroughly interrogated 
and verified, especially as it is attributed to a well-
known antagonist of Ja’far. An event that happened 
during Ja’far’s lessons at the Indimi Mosque would 
certainly not have been attended by the renowned 
Sufi, Abulfathi. When he reports it, then scholars 
are duty-bound to subject it to authentication in 
order to establish its veracity.
The author discusses Ja’far’s antagonism 
towards Boko Haram, only to reduce it to a mere 
“power struggle,” relying on an anonymous 
analyst (p.102). A polemical question may be 
relevant here: thus, should all the Tijjani, Qadiri 
and other young and elderly Salafi scholars who 
challenged Boko Haram also be regarded as people 
who struggled for power against Muhammad 
Yusuf? The truth is that Ja’far was concerned 
about the predictable destructive consequences of 
Yusuf’s call, just as he was worried about how the 
movement was drawing the Muslim community 
backwards and also tilting towards radicalization 
and violence. He was known to motivate the 
youth to pursue education and to specialize in 
various fields, especially medicine, engineering, 
law and other sciences. It is common knowledge 
that he toured the northern Nigerian universities 
where he would impress upon students that it is 
imperative to be serious with their studies of the 
various specializations of Western-style education 
and political participation. It is logical, then, that 
any call for the youth to withdraw from school, 
abandon politics and take to radicalism would 
be seen by him as an attack on the very mission 
that he had taken for himself. He would no doubt 
be antagonistic towards Boko Haram; a group 
built on the pillars of attacking “democracy, 
constitutionalism, alliances with non-Muslims, 
and Western-style education” (see p.106).
In common with many other scholars, Ja’far 
could have “mentored” Yusuf for some time on 
some things he mastered, believed in, practiced 
and preached. However, a clear picture is needed 
concerning the impact of each of Yusuf’s teachers 
and “mentors” on his thoughts and approach 
before any conclusions can be drawn on who 
coached Yusuf on radicalism and antagonism 
towards Western-style education, democracy and 
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working under a “kufr government.” Before his first 
contact with Ja’far, Yusuf was already a popular 
young preacher, known for his controversial and 
extremist views. These views related to fighting the 
constitution, rejecting any participation in the “kufr 
government” and even the necessity of ousting 
that government by force; these are all views 
which Ja’far never had, either before or after going 
to Maiduguri. If Yusuf had really been “incubated” 
by several scholars at different stages of his career, 
then this conclusion would only be academically 
plausible if the influences and impact of each of 
these scholars and “mentors” were studied against 
the background of the ideologies and approaches of 
Yusuf and his Boko Haram group.
The author shows that Muhammad Yusuf 
“gravitated towards Salafism” in the late 1990s. 
By then, Salafism “possessed strong networks 
and mosque infrastructures in Maiduguri and 
beyond – infrastructures that Yusuf soon sought 
to both co-opt and challenge” (p.62). This 
statement raises a number of questions regarding 
the “whys” of Yusuf’s embracing of Salafism; for 
instance, was the motive only to use Salafism as 
a convenient platform for propagating an already 
crafted agenda which he understood could only 
be marketed if wrapped in a Sunni-Salafi attire 
given the popularity of the Salafi scholars? This 
statement also unveils that Yusuf had a short stay 
with Ja’far who started annual Qur’ānic exegesis 
(tafsīr) in Maiduguri in 1994; however, as the 
author stated himself, Yusuf only joined Salafism 
in the late 1990s. Where had Yusuf been before 
then? What was he doing? What was he preaching? 
Here, the author has reported that: “During all the 
days of his preaching, Yusuf presented himself as 
a mainstream Salafi” (p.98), which implies that he 
only started preaching in the late 1990s. But this 
is far from being true, as Yusuf had already been 
a preacher since the early 1990s. Thus, he actually 
started preaching and giving sermons and lectures 
in 1992 as the mouthpiece of El-Zakzaky’s radical 
brotherhood. It would be useful, therefore, to 
investigate what he was teaching and preaching 
and whether it was the general alienation and 
rejection of his earlier Zakzakiyya platform by 
the northern Nigerian Muslim community, and 
particularly the Borno community, that really 
brought him into Salafism to use its already-
accepted alternative infrastructure in propagating 
his already established ideologies. Thurston seems 
to be suspicious of a similarly sinister agenda 
when he asserts that Yusuf “tried to smuggle 
jihadist thought into a Salafi community that 
had originally been oriented more toward non-
jihadist Salafism” (p.109). It would have been 
useful to investigate, in more depth, how and 
from where he acquired the jihadist thoughts that 
he smuggled into Salafism. In particular, which 
of his non-Salafi Nigerian “mentors” could have 
introduced him to such ideologies and for how 
long was he attracted by, and preaching these 
ideologies, before embracing Salafism?
The author analyses Yusuf’s antagonism 
towards the emirates and traditional authorities 
and again links this to the influence of Ja’far. 
However, even the adversaries of Ja’far may find 
this viewpoint difficult to accept. It is well known 
that the position of the Salafis, Ja’far in particular, 
is one of respect, reverence, consideration and 
regard towards traditional institutions. It was 
common knowledge in northern Nigeria that he 
had direct and respectful relationships with most 
of the emirs such as the Sultan of Sokoto, the late 
Shehu of Borno, the late Emir of Kano, and those of 
Dutse, Kazaure, Gombe, Bauchi, Suleja and indeed 
nearly all of them. Many of his tapes are testimonies 
to this. This approach should be expected from a 
graduate of a Saudi Arabian university, bearing in 
mind the well-known apologetic stance of the Saudi 
Salafi scholars regarding the relationship between 
the ‘ulamā’ and the leaders. At times, he differed 
with some traditional leaders on specific issues 
and he even challenged their positions on certain 
matters. One example is the case of the Sufi-Salafi 
rift on the Sabuwar Gandu mosque where he and 
his fellow Salafis felt that the Emirate authorities in 
Kano had sided with the Sufis in doing injustice to 
them.3 Even in this case, Ja’far specifically accused 
some elements within the institution, but not the 
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Emir, for trying to use their influence to mislead 
the Emir in to acting unjustly against them. He 
stated: 
We do not see the entire Kano Emirate, 
from its alif to ya’, from its A to Z, as being 
(comprised of) our enemies. There are 
those who love our cause; those who 
support the truth and justice… We 
have no doubt that there are those 
who do all this in the palace. But there 
are (also) our enemies who use their 
influence in the palace against us. 
These people can mislead the emirate 
to engage in a clash with religion.
And he continued by stating:
Out of our regard and obedience 
for them, we show reverence to our 
traditional leaders, we usually go to 
them and request them to do that (i.e., 
to give approval and royal blessing to 
open our mosques) even as we are 
aware that they have not been given 
that right constitutionally; it has 
been confiscated from them (by the 
colonial authorities), and we want to 
reclaim it for them…
This example shows that, even when he disagreed 
with the emirs on some issues, Ja’far usually 
expressed his disagreement with respect and 
regard for their status. Thus, he would address 
them as Mai Martaba (Your Highness) and would 
pray for Allah’s protection, support and guidance 
for them as is the norm in the north. Nearly 
all Muslim scholars and groups, including the 
Tijjaniyya, Izala, the Salafiyya, and Qadiriyya, have 
a loyalty, reverence and a cordial relationship 
with the traditional institutions. For example, the 
Salafi organization Izala indicated clearly in its 
first constitution in 1978, in respect to its Council 
of Elders, that “the organization has a very high 
regard for this Council; its leader may be one of 
the Muslim emirs of this country-Nigeria. All the 
Muslim emirs of this country may be members of 
the Council in their capacity as patrons of Islamic 
organizations in Nigeria.”4
The exception to this cordiality is Ibrahim El-
Zakzaky and his group. Since the 1980s, in fact, 
the latter have maintained a clearly antagonistic 
and disrespectful position towards the traditional 
authority, declaring an uncompromising stand 
against the Emirates and the Emirs; this is evident 
from their recorded songs and especially El-
Zakzaky’s lectures. In this regard, Bunza has noted 
that “The Iranian goal of releasing Muslims from 
monarchical and despotic rulers, as well as from 
‘imperialist’ forces made Muslim youth in Nigeria 
more receptive to the influences of the Iranian 
Islamic political movement” (p.229).5 Moreover, 
the teachings of the movement present it clearly 
as “a movement of rebellion against the Nigerian 
state, traditional rulers, emirs and the Sultan of 
Sokoto” (p.232). On some occasions they even 
had clashes with the traditional authorities. For 
instance, in June 2005 they confronted the emirate 
authorities in Sokoto on the issue of access to the 
mosque.6 In reference to the movement, Ashiru T. 
Umar relates that: 
The members regarded all government 
officials, leaders, traditional title 
holders, all military and para-military 
personnel of the nation as agents of 
dagutai (infidels/agent of Europeans 
and Jews) who are serving the interest 
of the West at all cost. All sort of 
names were used against traditional 
title holders (masu sarauta). Names 
like masu kahon tsumma and dagutai 
(people with turbans as horns of rags 
and idols) were used to describe their 
persons and titles.7
Thurston makes an interesting analysis of the 
“murky beginnings” of Boko Haram (pp.86-7) 
where he analyses some important factors that led 
to the acceptance and popularity of the “founder” 
of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf. This analysis 
is preceded by a thorough review of Yusuf’s 
“lifeworld” with the objective of “clarifying how 
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ideas and environments interacted to produce and 
sustain Boko Haram.” Here, the interplay between 
religion, politics and Boko Haram is also examined. 
Despite this somewhat detailed coverage of the 
biographical history of Muhammad Yusuf and 
the social, economic, political and religious 
environment in which he was born and brought 
up, there is a major omission in the study, that 
is the complete avoidance of the Zakzakiyya 
movement led by Ibrahim Zakzaky, which is 
arguably the first most significant juncture in the 
career of Yusuf as an active member of a radical 
religious group. Thurston is aware of Yusuf’s 
participation in the Zakzakiyya movement, just 
as, judging from his references and assertions, 
he has read many works that have extensively 
analysed the history of the Zakzakiyya movement. 
Nevertheless, he seems to have underestimated 
the possible impact of that movement in framing 
the thoughts of Muhammad Yusuf and shaping 
his future career. Indeed, Thurston’s book seems 
to suggest that the Zakzakiyya movement played 
no role in defining events in northern Nigeria’s 
arena of Islamic discourse and activism, as well 
as no role in shaping intra-Muslim and interfaith 
engagements. He reduces to a mere claim the 
historical fact of Yusuf’s earlier “allegiance to al-
Zakzaky” and his movement before their split with 
the Jama’atu Tajdidil Islam (JTI) in 1994 (p.66). For 
instance, Thurston (p.11) writes: 
Reading through the historical record, 
I found many post-colonial northern 
Nigerian elites  ‒ university intel-
lectuals, members of the hereditary 
ruling class, politicians, and others 
‒ espousing antipathy toward 
Western-style education and secular 
government. Few of these figures 
advocated armed jihad in the 1980s 
and 1990s8 […]. Nevertheless, it is 
important to show that Boko Haram’s 
ideas did not come out of thin air.
Although many points require more elucidation, 
Thurston moves on to another discussion: if “Boko 
Haram’s ideas did not come out of thin air,” where 
did they come from? If there was antipathy towards 
Boko, and if some elites had called for armed jihad 
since the 1980s, then who were they, and how 
did their “Boko Haram” of the 1980s-90s relate to 
the second Boko Haram of the 2000s? Who were 
those major actors advocating for what renowned 
northern Nigerian scholars and historians such as 
Mahadi refer to as “the first Boko Haram?”9
Similarly, what were the possible influences of the 
ideological framings of the 1980s “antipathy toward 
Western-style education and secular government”? 
What influenced the advocacy for “armed jihad” 
on Muhammad Yusuf, who, reliably, was an active 
participant in the movement that openly criticized 
Boko, fought the “kufr government” and advocated 
for armed “jihād” against the security forces and 
the government? Who was the “incubator” of the 
first Boko Haram and did he “mentor” Muhammad 
Yusuf? Is there any evidence to show that the call 
to abandon Western-style schools as a pre-requisite 
for entrenching an Islamic State in Nigeria was 
apparently visible in an earlier youth movement 
in which Yusuf played an active part? The same 
applies to calls to withdraw from the employment 
in Nigeria’s “kufr” democratic government, against 
a background of incessant clashes with the security 
establishments. In a documentary history book 
long over than three hundred pages, dedicated to 
research into Boko Haram, it would seem to be a 
major oversight not to analyse how Boko Haram of 
the 1980s could have contributed to the making of 
Yusuf. 
Moreover, El-Zakzaky himself had stressed, 
during the Shari’ah agitations of the early 2000s, 
that no Shari’ah could be implemented peacefully 
and that Shari’ah could only be practiced under 
a fully-fledged Islamic State established through 
bloodshed.10 Likewise, Yusuf was clear in his 
call for armed “jihad” against the government. 
However, Thurston writes that “Neither Izala nor 
the Medina graduates felt that Nigeria needed an 
armed jihad” (p.105).
Thurston traces the origins of the “Boko 
Haram” of the 1980s and 1990sto the very people 
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who, at that time, were busy using the media 
and touring higher institutions of learning to 
encourage students to pursue excellence in boko. 
He writes that “a more direct influence on Yusuf 
was Salafis’ mistrust of colonial and Western-style 
schools” and that, according to him, Abubakar 
Mahmoud Gumi was the leading Salafis who 
had this “more direct influence” in encouraging 
Yusuf to fight boko. This is simply misleading. But 
an even more farfetched analysis is the author’s 
rather out-of-context reference to the position of 
Waziri Junaidu (d. 1997; former wazir of Sokoto) 
on Boko, in his doctoral acceptance speech at 
Ahmadu Bello University; Thurston cites this while 
trying to buttress his point that Muslim scholars 
throughout the twentieth century had fanned the 
“flames of anti-Western sentiment” (p.75).
The book contains a few misprints. For 
example, s is omitted in “Islam itself forbid 
Western Style education” (p.14); referred is 
written as “deferred;” al-Maydughuri is written as 
“al-Maydughari” (replacing u with a) in footnote 
15 (p.89); to is missing in “that did little curb 
elite corruption” (p.124); Buji Foi is addressed 
as Governor Sheriff’s minister instead of 
Commissioner (p.126); is is repeated in “…what 
is their reason is…” and Mohammed is written 
as “Mohamed” (p.147); Kashim is written as 
“Kashima” (p.203), and the name of Imam Gapcia 
written as “Dapcia” (p.223).
In all, Thurston has given readers a well-
researched work on Boko Haram, which is 
unprecedented in its depth and rigor. He has 
demonstrated intellectual stamina, raised 
fundamental issues and made far-reaching policy 
recommendations. His work has also shown that 
there is a lot to be learned from, and still to be 
discovered, in Boko Haram studies. It has also 
posed a serious challenge to academics and 
scholars, especially those in the northern Nigerian 
universities; it has shown that they need to start 
seeing the world of Boko Haram as a vast and fertile 
area for research, with a number of researchable 
socio-political issues.
Like anybody else, Thurston might not always 
be totally correct in his theses and hypotheses, as 
well as in his analysis and conclusions; however, 
he is certainly not totally incorrect. In fact, a 
library without Boko Haram: The History of an African 
Jihadist Movement is an incomplete library.
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The “Popular Discourses of
Salafi Counter-Radicalism in 
Nigeria” Revisited:
A Response to Abdullahi Lamido’s 
Review of Alexander Thurston,
Boko Haram
Andrea Brigaglia
University of Cape Town
“According to Fanon, the goal of the native intellectual cannot simply be to replace a white policeman 
with his native counterpart, but rather what he called, borrowing from Aimé Césaire, the invention 
of new souls. In other words, although there is inestimable value to what an intellectual does to 
ensure a community’s survival during periods of extreme national emergency, loyalty to a group’s 
fight for survival cannot draw in the intellectual as far as to narcotize the critical sense, or reduce its 
imperatives, which are always to go beyond survival to questions of political liberation, to critiques of 
the leadership, to presenting alternatives that are too often marginalized or pushed aside as irrelevant 
to the main battle at hand. Even among the oppressed there are also victors and losers, and the 
intellectual’s loyalty must not be restricted only to joining the collective march.”
“A condition of marginality, which might seem irresponsible or flippant, frees you from having always 
to proceed with caution, afraid to overturn the applecart, anxious about upsetting fellow members of 
the same corporation.”
(Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures, New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
Respectively p.41 and p.52.)
In his review of Alexander Thurston’s monograph 
on Boko Haram, Abdullahi Lamido questions 
Thurston’s decision to refer to a meeting that 
purportedly occurred between Shaykh Ja‘far 
Mahmoud Adam (d. 2007) and Shaykh Muhammad 
Yusuf (d. 2009) in the Indimi mosque in Maiduguri.1 
During this meeting the former, who was the most 
respected Salafi scholar of his time in Nigeria, 
allegedly said about the latter, who would later 
establish the jihadi organisation known to the 
world as Boko Haram: “if today there are no more 
scholars in Borno, this man is sufficient for you 
as an Islamic guide.” Lamido’s position is that this 
meeting never actually occurred, and therefore 
Thurston is at fault for relying on a biased source 
(a Sufi scholar from Maiduguri) who mentioned 
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this meeting in an online publication2. From the 
empirical point of view, this argument should be 
easy to settle: according to various oral sources, 
the video of this meeting was broadcast in the first 
NTA (Nigerian Television Authority) documentary 
on Boko Haram, released shortly after the first 
Boko Haram crisis of July/August 2009. It should 
not be too difficult for anyone based in Nigeria to 
have access to this documentary and to verify it.
Lamido, however, moves beyond a mere 
criticism of an empirical point, and accuses 
Thurston of following my conjectures, advanced 
in four articles published between 2012 and 2018, 
in which, “in an eccentrically unscientific way,” I 
supposedly tried “to portray Ja’far as Yusuf’s coach 
on Boko Haram.”3 This criticism necessitates a 
more articulate response.
Of Conjectures and Refutations
I am thankful to Lamido for taking my conjectures 
seriously enough to deserve his refutation. 
Conjectures, however ‒ if one follows Karl Popper 
‒ far from being unscientific eccentricities, are 
the very essence of the methodology of a proper 
scientific enquiry.4 It is only through conjectures 
and refutations, argued the German philosopher, 
that scientific knowledge advances. This does 
not necessarily mean, however, that if we had to 
come to an agreement about a specific empirical 
point (for instance, whether or not the Indimi 
mosque meeting ever occurred), the ongoing 
debate about the origins of Boko Haram would 
automatically be settled. Especially in the human 
sciences, interpretation is as important as, if not 
more important than, fact-finding. And as argued 
by Hans-Georg Gadamer, partly in response to 
Popper, such an interpretation (of a text or of a 
historical event) is determined as much by the 
hermeneutic horizon of the enquirer as by the 
object of his or her enquiry.5
One has to acknowledge that both Lamido and 
I are not entering this debate as empty observers, 
but as engaged participants. We not only have 
theological and political persuasions, but also 
genuine (and legitimate) personal and emotional 
concerns; after all, the Boko Haram crisis directly 
and dramatically affected some of the places and 
the people we care about most in our lives. We 
thus enter the debate about the origins of Boko 
Haram with a baggage of theological, political 
and emotional commitments. These, far from 
being an obstacle to intellectual enquiry, are 
the essence of the role of the intellectual as an 
amateur (intended in the etymological sense of the 
word as “someone who loves, who cares about the 
object of his intellectual enquiry”) that Edward 
Said, in some of the most insightful pages of his 
celebrated 1993 lectures, proposed as the antidote 
to the dangers of the professionalisation of the 
human sciences imposed by modern academia.6 As 
the CCI Occasional Papers are conceived precisely as 
a space for such forms of engaged debates, we are 
happy to host, and participate in, this exchange of 
“conjectures and refutations.”
Now, the first point that needs to be made 
clear is that, contrary to what Lamido argued, my 
conjecture is not, and has never been, that Shaykh 
Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam had anticipated, supported 
or planned a jihadi insurrection against the 
Nigerian State like the one waged, shortly after his 
death, by Boko Haram. As I wrote in 2015, a jihad 
against the Nigerian government was obviously 
something that Shaykh Ja‘far “would have 
certainly disapproved of.”7 In this sense, I share 
with Lamido the opinion that Ja‘far cannot be 
considered as the coach of Yusuf on Boko Haram.
Yet, Ja‘far’s closeness with Yusuf, before the two 
broke away between 2002 and 2003, is so openly 
discussed by the first in his own speeches,8 that no 
one can seriously question it, whether or not the 
Indimi mosque meeting actually took place. My 
effort in documenting and interpreting the origins 
and successive developments of the Boko Haram 
phenomenon, however, is entirely built on a 
fundamental scepticism towards linear explanations. 
In trying to explain the choices of the multiple 
local and global actors that collectively shaped 
the phenomenon (Muhammad Yusuf; his Izala 
and Ahlus Sunna critics including Ja‘far; the NGO 
Al-Muntada al-Islami; the Saudi establishment; 
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War on Terror actors; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghrib; Abubakar Shekau; the Islamic State; etc.), 
my attention was always on the discontinuities, 
contradictions and hesitations of their individual or 
collective trajectories. For I believe that our human 
condition is defined more by the push-and-pulls 
of multiple, often contradictory commitments, 
than by linear strategies, limpid “worldviews” and 
direct cause-effect relations.
Now let us move to my actual conjectures. 
The first conjecture I had advanced concerned 
the Kanamma camp issue. At the time when I 
was writing, this camp was considered, in most 
of the literature, as having hosted a puritanical 
but pacific Salafi commune, which had migrated 
from the Indimi mosque and inexplicably turned 
violent in late 2003 leading to brief clashes with 
the Nigerian military. My conjecture was that this 
camp was hosting the first experiment of a Jihadist 
training camp in Nigerian territory, perhaps (I used 
a question mark in the original quote) linked to Al-
Qaeda. Today, at least two internal sources (a Boko 
Haram member interviewed by the International 
Crisis Group, and an article published by the Al-
Qaeda official magazine)9 suggest that the leader of 
Kanamma, Muhammad Ali, had allegedly received a 
promise of funding from Osama Bin Laden in order 
to start a branch of his organisation in Nigeria. The 
money never arrived at its destination and so the 
training in the camp never started. This can possibly 
explain why the Kanamma youth, impatient and 
frustrated, decided to act. The decision led to 
disagreements with Yusuf himself, who in contrast, 
advised patience and a long-term strategy. Yet, the 
fact that the Kanamma experiment was meant at 
hosting an Al-Qaeda camp, is a widely accepted 
hypothesis today; therefore, my first conjecture 
stands stronger now than four years ago, when it 
was formulated.
My second conjecture was that some of the 
mainstream Salafi leadership of Izala and Ahlus 
Sunna, and perhaps even Ja‘far himself, had 
originally agreed to, or silently allowed, the 
establishment of such a liaison between the 
Kanamma group and Al-Qaeda, believing that this 
liaison would have been used to provide fighters 
for the jihad they supported in Afghanistan (and 
then in Iraq), and not an insurgency against the 
Nigerian government. My hypothesis was supported 
by the fact that at the time, various prominent 
scholars in the Izala/Ahlus Sunna camp were 
openly preaching in favour of Al-Qaeda, as well 
as by the fact that before migrating to Kanamma, 
the group had originally formed among the 
public of the Indimi mosque, which was the most 
popular, mainstream Izala/Ahlus Sunna mosque 
in Maiduguri. A following section of my response 
will elaborate more on this. In the meantime, 
it is important to stress that in analysing the 
data that demonstrate that a preaching of this 
nature occurred for various years, I have never 
advanced the argument that the Izala/Ahlus 
Sunna leadership comprised inherently “violent, 
extremist terrorists.” My analysis, in fact, has 
always deliberately avoided the use of emotionally 
charged, and politically and empirically elusive 
categories as “violent extremism,” or adjectives 
as “terrorist” attributed to individuals (as 
opposed to actions). Violence, from my point 
of view, is a universal possibility of human life, 
and not an immutable and essential attribute 
of certain individuals or “worldviews.” As for 
extremism, it is a purely contextual attribution, 
whose content depends on the specific nature of 
the “moderation” that a given discourse is trying 
to promote. Terrorism is a political strategy that 
can potentially be adopted by insurrectionist 
movements of any political or religious colour, 
and even by the very state power that is engaged 
in counter-insurgency strategies.10 While better 
than any of the above, “jihadi” too is a tricky term, 
not only because Jihad has acted historically, 
and will probably continue to act, as a powerful 
symbol for Muslims of all orientation (both as a 
tool of mobilisation for communities in situations 
of duress and for states in justification of their 
expansionist agendas); but more importantly 
because a jihad is always under someone’s leadership 
and against a specific enemy, an obvious fact that 
the use of the adjective jihadi as a generic label 
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tends to obscure. This is why I have always 
preferred to refrain from using any of these labels 
whenever possible, and have limited myself to (1) 
describing ethnographically the multi-layered 
public discourses produced by the Nigerian 
Salafis; (2) narrating (and drafting hypotheses on 
the causes of) their gradual implosion, seen as a 
historical process that occurred over many years; 
(3) pointing to this implosion as the necessary 
background to understand the conflict started in 
the early-to-mid-2000s between the leadership of 
Izala/Ahlus Sunna and Muhammad Yusuf.
My third conjecture, strictly linked to the 
second, was that the break between Muhammad 
Yusuf and the Izala/Ahlus Sunna leadership 
was not due to the progressive ideological 
radicalisation of the former, as suggested by most 
analysists, but to the progressive de-radicalisation 
of the public discourses of the latter. These rapidly 
shifted, between the early and the late 2000s, 
from endorsement to avoidance to rejection of 
the global jihad of Al-Qaeda, creating a sense of 
disorientation in the Salafi public. This shift was 
probably produced by a mix of external pressures 
(exerted, for instance, by the Saudi ‘ulamā’ loyal to 
the Kingdom, which from the year 2003 onwards 
was increasingly invested in the War on Terror), 
internal politics (the consideration that the 
takfīr of the Nigerian government theoretically 
enjoined by Al-Qaeda’s ideology, was not in the 
political interests nor in the cultural chords of 
most Nigerian Salafi constituencies) and ethical 
re-thinking (the rejection of the mass violence 
that Al-Qaeda promoted as the necessary strategy 
to achieve its aims). This shift had far-reaching 
consequences, for it alienated those, like Yusuf, 
who decided to remain faithful to the promotion 
of an ideology styled on Al-Qaeda's, even when 
they were unable to entertain direct links with the 
leadership of the latter.
Organic connections between Al-Qaeda-Central 
and the Nigerian arena also existed, but there is 
no need to exaggerate them. Nevertheless, one 
should bear in mind that the entire structure 
of Al-Qaeda was built upon hundreds of loose 
connections woven around only a handful of 
organic ones. This looseness has been Al-Qaeda’s 
strength, as it has allowed it to spread rapidly even 
in the presence of the massive security apparatus 
displayed by the various countries engaged in 
their (often conflicting versions of) War on Terror. 
But it has also been Al-Qaeda’s weakness, as it has 
prevented it from exerting a full control on the 
many franchises it has produced. As documented 
by the many epistolary exchanges between, on 
the one side, al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden and, on 
the other side, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda-
Central could never exert full control even over 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has arguably been its 
most important and most successful franchise. 
In Nigeria, we know that a group organically 
connected to Al-Qaeda-Central tried to emerge 
in the early 2000s. The experiment was short-
lived if not aborted. The same group re-emerged, 
through a connection with AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the 
Maghrib) in 2009-2012, but it was soon decimated 
by the combined effects of the repression of the 
Nigerian security forces and of Shekau's rival 
jihadi project.
Still, we have to remember that Al-Qaeda in 
Nigeria was not only an organisation; it was also 
a discourse and a symbol that had far-reaching 
effects in the local Islamic arena, featuring for 
several years in public discourses aired from 
pulpits of mosques and desks of universities, or 
in literature circulated and discussed in Muslim 
students’ reading groups. This dimension tends 
to be forgotten in the debates around the possible 
extent reached by Al-Qaeda as an organisation in 
Nigeria, as well as in the analyses that read the 
Boko Haram vs Izala/Ahlus Sunna break as the 
mechanical and linear outcome of the ideological 
rift between a supposedly coherent and stable 
“Jihadi” project as opposed to a supposedly 
coherent and stable “Quietist” one.
My fourth conjecture, which can be considered 
to be a corollary of the second and third ones 
above, was that the origins of the very nickname 
Boko Haram are impossible to understand without 
looking more carefully at the discourses of the 
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Izala/Ahlus Sunna scholarly leadership against 
Yusuf. Here, in particular, one should take note 
of the curious but conspicuous absence of any 
reference, in the public engagements between 
the two groups, to the global jihad of Al-Qaeda. 
It is – I argued – because they were prevented 
by their former public endorsement of Al-Qaeda 
from addressing the issue openly, that the Izala/
Ahlus Sunna leaders who critically engaged Yusuf 
in public debates focused their discourses only 
on the relatively minor issue of halaccin karatun 
boko (permissibility of acquiring education in the 
government school system). From these debates, 
which were meant to hide more than they revealed, 
the smokescreen nickname Boko Haram filtered to 
the wider Nigerian Muslim public, and from it, to 
the international press and scholarly community.
My fifth and final conjecture was that the Salafi 
constituencies of Nigeria imploded naturally, 
“when a multiplicity of trends and rhetorical 
registers that had overlapped before, were 
not allowed to co-exist anymore,”11 because of 
Nigeria’s exposure “[to] the pressure created the 
War on Terror.”12 In order to clarify what I alluded 
to with this final point, as well as to reinforce my 
argument concerning points two, three and four 
above, my response will now turn to the speeches 
of Professor Isa Aliyu Pantami, who, more than 
anyone else in the Izala/Ahlus Sunna camp, can 
be seen as embodying the “counter-radical” 
discourses of the Nigerian mainstream Salafis that 
tried to delegitimise Muhammad Yusuf in the mid 
to late 2000s.
The Salafi Counter-Radical Discourses
in Nigeria Revisited
In 2012, an anonymous author published a rich 
analysis of the public debates that took place in 
the mid-2000s between some prominent Nigerian 
Salafi scholars and Muhammad Yusuf.13 One of 
the main sources of that author was the public 
debate that occurred on 25 June 2006 between 
Isa Aliyu Pantami and the first leader of Boko 
Haram.14 This article represented a turning point 
in the literature on Boko Haram, as it was the first 
contribution that started to take the ideological 
dimension of Boko Haram seriously and to 
submit it to a rigorous analysis. According to the 
author, Yusuf’s ideas represented a form of Salafi 
radicalism, while those voiced by Pantami (and by 
Ja‘far M. Adam, whose speeches against Yusuf are 
also discussed in the same article) were a form of 
Salafi counter-radicalism. This article extensively 
analysed the positions of the two camps on the 
issues of halaccin karatun boko (the legitimacy 
of western-style education) and halaccin aikin 
gwamnati (the legitimacy of working for the 
[Nigerian] government), but at the same time, as I 
argued elsewhere, it has failed to take note of, and 
to try to account for, a curious and conspicuous 
characteristic of these engagements; that is, the 
absence of any exchange of arguments on the 
legitimacy of Al-Qaeda’s project of global jihad. 
After all, while taking care to avoid threading 
any organic links with Al-Qaeda,15 Yusuf had been 
clear in his speeches: his was “a call to Jihad, and 
anyone who considers it as a call to preaching or 
education or teaching, or a call without essence, 
has not understood this call: for this is a jihadi call 
and a jihadi movement; a community of fighters, 
and not a community of preachers only.”16 
Why, then, did Ja‘far and Pantami not feel the 
need to discuss the issue of Jihad in their public 
engagements with him?
In order to account for this silence and to locate 
the counter-radical discourses of the Nigerian 
Salafi leadership in their broader historical and 
discursive context, I suggest that one should 
avoid dichotomous and a-contextual categories 
such as “radical” and “counter-radical,” and look 
more carefully at the discourses that the same 
Salafi scholars who were critically engaging Yusuf 
on karatun boko, were voicing, during the same 
years, on Al-Qaeda and its call for global jihad. In 
the following pages, I will briefly summarise and 
discuss three audio documents17 that, I believe, 
will help to achieve the above goals.
The first of these documents is from a lecture 
delivered by Pantami in the aftermath of the 
Yelwa Shendam massacres (May 2004), when 
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armed militias of (mainly Christian) ethnic Tarok 
attacked the community of Hausa Muslim residents, 
killing hundreds.18 The conflict was rooted in the 
tensions between “indigenous” and “settlers” that 
structurally characterise Nigeria’s ethnic-based 
federalism, with explosive consequences especially 
in the Middle Belt. Religion has naturally played a 
role in solidifying identities and exacerbating this 
conflict, and both Christian and Muslim leaders have 
contributed to the process. In his speech, Pantami 
invites Muslims, especially “Ahlus Sunna” (read 
Salafis), to be sceptical of politicians and religious 
leaders calling for peace and understanding, and 
to retaliate with jihad: “this jihad is an obligation 
for every single believer, especially in Nigeria” 
(hādhā jihād farḍ ‘ayn ‘ala kull muslim wa-khuṣūṣan 
fī Nījīriyā). Subsequently, Pantami offers himself 
as a volunteer to mobilise the Hisba police of the 
Muslim-majority states and to be appointed as 
the “commander” (Hausa: kwamanda) of a militia 
ready to travel to Yelwa Shendam to join the fight 
in defence of the Muslims. The speech, which is 
about twenty minutes long, concludes with the 
prayer: “Oh God, give victory to the Taliban and 
to al-Qaeda” (Allahumma ’nṣur Ṭālibān wa-tanẓīm al-
Qā‘ida).19
During his speech, Pantami is in tears and his 
voice is often broken by sighs. The genuineness 
of his emotional response to what was without 
doubt a dramatic episode in the history of violent 
conflict in Plateau State is obvious. This has to be 
acknowledged in order to contextualise the speech 
in its historical context, this emotional response 
providing another striking example of the politics 
of emotions that Alexander Thurston has correctly 
identified as one of the main discursive strategies 
of Muhammad Yusuf.20
More interesting, however, is a second speech, 
delivered by Pantami in 2006. In the speech, 
Pantami offers his public condolences for the 
death of the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Zarqawi. 
His introductory words are as follows:
May God have mercy on Aḥmad al-
Fāḍil al-Khalayleh, raḥmatullāh ‘alayhi. 
May God forgive his mistakes. He is a 
human being, he has certainly some 
mistakes in front of God, so may God 
forgive his mistakes. Who am I talking 
about? He is Abū Muṣ‘ab al-Zarqāwī. 
He was born in 1966 of the Christian 
era, that is forty years ago. […] After 
some time, he was given responsibility 
for a camp in Herat. It was the 
Commander of the Faithful (Amīr al-
mu’minīn) Mollah Omar ‒ may God 
preserve him ‒ who personally gave 
him the authority to run this camp.21
This introduction is followed by a brief biography of 
the deceased, with references to the disagreements 
between Zarqawi and Bin Laden during the Iraqi 
war, over which the author prefers not to take 
a clear position. After discussing his death in an 
American air strike, the author adds a prayer: “oh 
God, grant us the death of martyrdom,” repeated 
three times in Arabic and Hausa. Subsequently, 
he narrates that two days earlier, he had received 
an sms message of condolences for Zarqawi from 
a Professor at Bayero University Kano,22 bearing 
the words: “martyrdom for Abu Musaab al-
Zarqawi, insha Allah!,” and followed by a quote of 
the Quranic verse on martyrdom (Q2:154). Then, 
Pantami continues:
To this date, in the Community of 
the Prophet we have some awesome 
people, people of awesome faith,23 
who follow the creed of the Sunna 
and thanks to whom the enemies of 
God are unable to find rest in this 
world. They have killed the Shaykh, 
the martyr Abdallah Yusuf Azzam 
‒ may God have mercy on him ‒ but 
did the struggle end? They went on to 
strike Chechnya and they killed many 
of them: did it end? […] Whenever 
one goes, another one comes, and he 
is even more awesome than the first. 
The mother of Abū Muṣ‘ab ‒ may God 
have mercy on her ‒ died in 2002 of 
the Christian era. Before she passed 
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on, she prayed to God that her son 
may die as a martyr, so as to prevent 
the enemies of God to lay their hands 
on him. […] Did God answer her 
prayer or not? May God, then, take 
our lives too, as well as the lives of 
our teachers, as martyrs on the path 
of the creed of the Sunna. In a hadith 
reported in the collection of Muslim, 
the Prophet (sAws) said “whoever 
asks God martyrdom in sincerity, 
God will give him the station of the 
martyrs even if he dies on his bed.”24
Perhaps even more interesting than the second 
audio of Pantami’s lectures is the third and last 
one that I submit in this response. This is a lecture 
entitled Suwaye Taliban (Who are the Taliban), 
delivered by Pantami on 19 Sha’ban 1427 (12 
September 2006). In the introduction, the author 
states that the lecture was prompted by the love 
that the “people of the Sunna” (in this context, 
meaning the Salafis) have for the Taliban of 
Afghanistan, “due to all the signs of goodness 
that the latter display (al’amomin alheri da ake gani 
tare da su),” as well as in response to the efforts 
of “some western unbelievers” (wasu kafirai daga 
western world) who seem to have no other goal 
than to spoil the image of the Taliban by spreading 
false information about them.25
Moreover, continues Pantami, many Salafi 
youth in Nigeria, because of their extreme 
passion for political struggles (tsabar so ga harkar 
gwagwarmaya), have used the name of the Taliban 
to draw people towards sinful actions (this being 
obviously a reference to the “Nigerian Taliban” of 
Kanamma). The lecture, therefore, aimed to correct, 
on the one side, those in Nigeria who misuse the 
name of the Taliban, and on the other side, those 
who criticise them based on the false information 
provided by the western media. After this lecture, 
“if we see something that is worth imitating in them, 
we will imitate them based on certain knowledge 
(‘ala ‘ilm wa-yaqīn)”. Pantami perceives all of this 
as a “purely academic al’amari (issue)” aimed at 
responding to a demand for reliable information 
on the topic emanating especially from the base 
of Salafi youth in University campuses. And this 
is why, he continues, a few years before he had 
already delivered many similar lectures on the 
topic: in 2001, on the campus of the University of 
Maiduguri; in 2002, on the campus of the College 
of Legal and Islamic Studies, Misau; and, also in 
2002, on the campus of the Veterinary Research 
Institute, Vom. 
After the introduction, the lecture describes 
the context of the emergence of the Taliban in 
the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s against the Soviet 
forces. The author mentions all the major factions 
of the Afghan mujāhidīn in remarkable detail. His 
reconstruction, however, is partly vitiated by the 
lack of any mention of the most popular Afghani 
militia leader (at least in the north of the country), 
Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was killed by two Al-
Qaeda suicide bombers on 9 September 2001. 
Likewise, there is no mention of the early, joint US, 
Saudi and Pakistani involvement in the conflict. In 
Pantami’s “purist” reading of world geo-politics (a 
kind of reversed clash-of-civilizations scenario), 
there is no place to account for the killing by Al-
Qaeda’s bombers of a hero of the Afghan resistance, 
nor for the multiple alliances across Muslim 
and non-Muslim countries that characterise the 
conflicts of the Middle East and Central Asia, but 
only for Muslims versus unbelievers. 
The Arab foreign fighters who helped the 
Afghani resistance, and who would later develop 
into the Al-Qaeda network, have, on the contrary, 
a prominent role in his reconstruction. The 
Afghani resistance, in fact, according to Pantami 
was helped by the man who “is considered as the 
scholar of all the militants of this era, […] al-duktūr 
al-shaykh al-mujāhid Abdallah Yusuf Azzam – may 
God have mercy on him, pardon him, sanctify 
his secret and accept him among the martyrs.” 
This statement is followed by a brief biography 
of Azzam (d. 1989), with emphasis on the good 
relationships entertained by the latter with the 
Saudi scholars Bin Baz (d. 1999), Ibn al-‘Uthayimin 
(d. 2001), Salman al-Ouda and Safar al-Hawali. 
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Osama Bin Laden is also mentioned in various 
instances in this section, with his name always 
followed by the formula hafiẓahu ’Llāh (may God 
preserve him). At the same time, however, the 
government of Saudi Arabia is also the object of 
unreserved praises, being described as “our qibla” 
and “the original abode of faith.” 
The author mentions the Saudi and Pakistani 
involvement in the Afghani conflict as starting 
only after the end of the first Afghani war, in a 
section titled “the post-Soviet era.” It was the 
leadership of the Arab mujāhidīn ‒ Pantami 
continues ‒ who invited Muslim countries such 
as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to be involved in 
the post-war peace agreement, and not Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan who, in coordination with the 
United States, had funded the mujāhidīn for years. 
References are made to a meeting held between all 
the leaders of the Afghani factions in Medina, with 
quotes from a book authored by the Saudi scholar 
Mūsā al-Qarnī, who is one of Pantami’s main 
sources (and who would later, in 2011, be handed 
a 20-year prison term by the Saudi government). 
Similarly, the anarchy that followed the end of the 
anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan is not attributed by 
Pantami to the contrasting agendas of the various 
political actors involved (the Afghani factions, the 
US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab foreign 
fighters), but to the “divide and rule” policy of the 
kuffār (unbelievers). 
It was in response to this anarchy that “the 
Commander of the Believers, Mullah Mohammad 
Omar, may God preserve him,” entered the 
scene. The formation of the Taliban, on 1st 
Muharram 1415, corresponding to 24 June 1994, 
is reconstructed through accurate historical 
detail fused with some hagiographic data: the 
313 scholars who first established the Taliban, 
for example, correspond to the 313 companions 
who fought the Battle of Badr (624) alongside the 
Prophet. The ultimate goal of the Taliban was to 
bring peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan by 
“establishing an Islamic leadership, a Caliphate 
and the Sharia, as every Muslim is commanded to 
do.” Here Pantami relies not only on the book by 
al-Qarnī but also on The Rise of the Taliban26 and on 
a book by the Nigerian Salisu Shehu, Who are the 
Talibans.
Pantami feels that the Taliban are not immune 
from error. His particular concern is that “about 
5% of them” have a penchant for Sufism, which 
obviously is, in his eyes, an imperfection in their 
credentials. The remaining 95%, however, are 
rooted in the “purest Sunni doctrine” (tataccen 
aƙidar Sunna): “they are people raised in the 
religious way, may God enable us to imitate their 
good” (mutane masu tarbiya ta addini, Allah ya ba mu 
ikon koyi da alheransu). In particular, Pantami feels 
that the Taliban are to be praised and imitated in 
three respects. The first is the destruction of the 
two “idols of the Buddha” at Bamiyan. In imitating 
them, the Nigerian Muslims should long for the 
day in which every “idolatrous image” will be 
erased from the Nigerian currency, and no picture 
will be used on passports and electoral posters, for 
photos and images are contrary to the Sharia. The 
second is their effort to impose a strict adherence 
to the Sunna in the dress code of Afghani women 
(full face-veiling) and men (fist-long beard and 
trousers cut at the length of the ankle). The third 
is the protection offered to Osama Bin Laden after 
the Americans rushed to accuse him of being 
responsible for the events of 9/11, by arguing 
that not only was there insufficient proof of his 
involvement, but also that “even if he had done it, 
according to the Sharia he should not be handed 
to you.”
The section concludes with a quote from Safar 
al-Hawali which is also a favourite scare-quote 
in the reservoir of contemporary islamophobes, 
according to which “hating America is part of 
our creed.” This is followed by prayers for the 
success of the Taliban; new comparisons between 
the Taliban and the Prophet’s Companions; and 
prayers for Bin Baz, al-Albani, Ibn al-‘Uthayimin 
and Azzam. Finally, there is an invitation to 
learn from the Taliban’s experience by studying 
hard “medicine and engineering” while patiently 
preparing for the moment when Nigeria will be 
ripe for a leader of the stature of Mullah Omar. 
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For further referencing, Pantami invites his public 
to read the following books: Join the Caravan and 
al-Difā‘ ‘an arāḍī al-muslimīn by Abdullah Azzam; 
Amrīka allatī ra’aytuha and As’ila ‘an Amrīka by 
Salman al-Ouda. 
The three audios summarised above provide a 
perfect illustration of my point that in the early-
to-mid-2000s there were various, contradictory 
levels of discourses and ideological allegiances 
coexisting within the public preaching of the 
Izala/Ahlus Sunna leadership. One level was 
promoting Al-Qaeda’s Global Jihad; a second 
level was promoting the “politico-Salafi” ideas of 
the likes of Salman al-Ouda and Safar al-Hawali, 
encouraging political participation in Nigeria; 
while a third level was expressing loyalty to Saudi 
Arabia. As I argued in 2015, the three categories 
of “Jihadi, politico, and quietist Salafis” might 
have some heuristic value in the context of Saudi 
Arabia’s absolute monarchy, but become virtually 
meaningless for the global Salafi constituencies, 
where the three levels of discourse emanating 
from the three competing canons overlap, creating 
unpredictable hybridisations. 
Nothing prevents, in fact, a group of 
Salafis in a specific country to rely on 
some early fatwa by Bin Bāz or al-Albāni 
to cautiously advocate participation 
in their national politics, while at 
the same time promoting (openly or 
secretly) the cause of jihad somewhere 
else in the world (yesterday Iraq or 
Chechnya, today Syria or Libya), but 
also recognizing the legitimacy of the 
Saudi monarchy.27
As I have already stated above, my point in referring 
to the preceding speeches is not, and has never 
been, to argue that scholars such as Pantami and 
his fellow Izala/Ahlu Sunna leaders were “violent 
Jihadis,” for I do not believe in the usefulness of this 
label in the first place. What I insist in pointing out 
is that Izala’s “counter-radical” discourses against 
Muhammad Yusuf and his associates (discourses 
to which we owe the very label “Boko Haram” with 
which the group came to be known) were a castle 
built on the sand of the unsustainable co-existence 
between multiple and contradictory levels of 
symbolic and ideological allegiances. Through 
lectures such as the ones discussed above, the 
mainstream Salafi clerics were presenting to the 
Nigerian public an imaginary scenario where al-
Hawali and al-Ouda (icons of the politico-Salafis), 
Bin Baz and the Saudi government (symbols of 
the quietist Salafis), Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi 
(epitomes of the jihadi Salafis), appeared as one 
single entity engaged coherently in a conflict 
with the "unbelievers" (the Soviet Union and 
subsequently, the United States) and the Rafidites 
(the Shia and the Iranian government). Yet, at the 
time, al-Hawali and al-Ouda had already spent five 
years (1994-1999) in Saudi prisons, having been 
arrested by the Saudi government for their political 
activism, with the blessing or the silence of Bin Baz 
who was the mufti of the country. And in 2003, Al-
Qaeda had started a campaign of bombings against 
the ṭāghūt (idolater, tyrant) Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. It is easy to see how, to an inquisitive mind 
such as Yusuf’s, a little additional research into the 
geo-politics of the Middle East and the cleavages 
of Saudi Arabia’s internal politics, or some first-
hand reading of the literature produced by the Al-
Qaeda-aligned scholars, would result into a state of 
cognitive dissonance and encourage him to question 
the authority of the scholars from whom these 
lectures emanated.
Indeed, the Nigerian Salafi public, which is 
passionately inquisitive by nature and nurture, was 
not passively receiving the knowledge provided 
by Pantami’s lectures. The inherent ambiguities, 
as well as the possible unintended consequences 
of his lectures, are perfectly represented in the 
three questions asked by the audience after his 
lecture on the Taliban. The first questioner asked 
how one should respond to those Salafis who 
reject Osama Bin Laden because of his killing of 
innocent unbelievers; this is probably a reference 
to the quietist and Saudi-loyalist strand of Salafi 
thought in Nigeria, represented by scholars such 
as Muhammad Sani Umar Rijiyar Lemo. Pantami 
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responded to the questioner by saying that yes, 
these scholars have some truth, for Bin Laden is 
liable to make mistakes, but “I still consider him 
as a better Muslim than myself.” “We are all happy 
whenever unbelievers are being killed,” continued 
Pantami, “but the Sharia does not allow us to 
kill them without a reason.” “Our zeal (hamasa) 
should not take precedence over our obedience 
to the sacred law.” The first question, which tried 
to push the author to take a clear position on the 
strategy and the ethical legitimacy of Al-Qaeda’s 
Jihad, was thus evaded. 
The second questioner asked how a jihad could 
take place in Nigeria when there is no consensus 
over a leader, in contrast to the consensus that 
(if one has to believe to the lecture) existed in 
Afghanistan around the figure of Mullah Omar. 
Pantami answered that this was precisely the goal 
of his lecture; in other words, to point out the need 
to establish in Nigeria an overall Islamic leadership 
similar to Mullah Omar’s, before moving to the 
next step. In Nigeria, continued Pantami (emphasis 
added), this is the time for correction (gyara) and 
preparation (isti‘dād): “How can you start a jihad, 
when your father is still going around without 
a beard? When your mother is still going around 
with a mere transparent veil (gyale) rather than 
with a full-length hijab?” Any effort to start a jihad 
without having established correct Islamic practices 
is doomed to failure, and this is precisely the main 
lesson to draw from the Afghan Taliban, whose 
success was established upon their unwavering 
attachment to the Sunna. This is the reason, 
concluded Pantami with a new reference to the 
“Kanamma affair” and to his critical engagement 
with Yusuf, why “any attempt to start a struggle 
that you have seen me rejecting so far, [it was 
because] it was not led by scholars and there was 
no understanding of the Sunna.” Thus the second 
question, focused on the possible implementation 
of jihad in Nigeria, was answered with a call for 
postponement (irjā’, Yusuf would say). 
The third questioner asked how to make sense of 
the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the western 
countries fighting Al-Qaeda, such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Unfortunately, 
the recording stops before one can listen to 
Pantami’s answer. As Pantami is not an outsider to 
Saudi Arabia (he holds a teaching position in the 
Faculty of Computing and Information Systems of 
the Islamic University of Medina), it would have 
been particularly interesting to hear his position 
on the matter.
The documents discussed above, together with 
similar ones published elsewhere,28 should have 
now conclusively demonstrated that until the mid-
2000s, it was ordinary for Nigeria’s mainstream 
Salafis to endorse Al-Qaeda publicly in their 
speeches and lectures. In this respect, Nigeria was 
probably a unique case in the Muslim world. It is 
difficult, in fact, to imagine any other country in 
West Africa or in the Middle East where similar 
public endorsements of Zarqawi and Bin Laden, 
during the same years and aired in the halls of 
public universities, would be so uncontroversial 
(to the point of passing unnoticed to most outsider 
observers). 
As historians and anthropologists writing on 
Boko Haram (a movement that emerged during 
the same years and at least partly overlapped with 
the public that attended Pantami's and Ja'far's 
lectures), we should not have failed to notice, or 
swept under the carpet, the Nigerian anomaly 
of a "counter-radical" Salafi organisation that 
continued to preach in favour of Al-Qaeda well 
into the year 2006. By doing that, we have done an 
unexpected favour to the terrorism study experts 
we accuse, rightly or wrongly, of being obsessed 
with the threat of Al-Qaeda.29 
It is only by taking these diffuse pro-Al-Qaeda 
discourses into consideration, and by putting 
them in their authentic historical and discursive 
context (just as we should be ready to document 
the growth of islamophobic discourses in the West, 
and seriously take into account the possibility 
that they have provided an ideological rationale 
for anti-Muslim violence in the West), that our 
writings as historians can reflect the analytical 
depth and the ethical integrity we claim for our 
disciplines.
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Does the existence of these discourses, by itself, 
prove beyond any doubt the most contentious 
of my conjectures, i.e. that when a feeble liaison 
with Al-Qaeda was being established by a small 
group of Nigerians which was mainly composed of 
university students and which, before migrating to 
Kanamma, was based in the major Salafi mosque 
of Maiduguri, their project might have originally 
received the blessing or the tacit support of at least 
some of the mainstream Salafi scholars? Certainly 
not. A second, possible conjecture is that the Izala/
Ahlus Sunna scholars were merely using their 
references to Al-Qaeda as a symbolic and rhetorical 
resource, without any awareness of the fact that 
at the same time, a small network of their Salafi 
public was threading those links. What is certain, 
however, is that one should now serenely dismiss 
the third conjecture that holds that Muhammad 
Yusuf was the only major Nigerian scholar to act 
as the mouthpiece for the ideology of global Jihad, 
and that this led to his immediate marginalisation 
from Izala.30 While the halal-ness of boko was 
indeed a matter of debate between Yusuf and 
Pantami, in fact, the legitimacy of Al-Qaeda was 
not; after all, that organisation had made its entry 
in the discourses of the Nigerian Salafi circles with 
a huge “halal stamp” provided by years of open, 
public endorsements by mainstream Salafi clerics. 
Of Scapegoating, Utopia and Tragedy
Likewise one should serenely dismiss a fourth 
conjecture recently emerging from the Boko 
Haram studies and holding that Yusuf’s ideas 
mainly derived from the influence of Shiism. The 
bulk of Lamido’s review is based on this fourth 
conjecture, and argues that the responsibility 
for Yusuf’s “radical” ideas lies squarely in the 
preaching of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and of his Shia 
movement, the IMN (Islamic Movement in Nigeria), 
in which Yusuf had a brief history of activism in 
the early 1990s, before he left it in anger when El-
Zakzaky had made his Shiism public. 
El-Zakzaky was well-known for his (at times 
reckless) calls to Islamic activism, especially during 
the 1980s and the 1990s. He had paid a huge price 
for them, serving long prison terms under the 
military governments of Babangida and Abacha. 
The new millennium, however, was characterised 
by the emergence of a virulently anti-Shia form 
of global jihadism as the one represented by the 
ideology of Al-Qaeda first and of ISIS later. This 
naturally provided the context for the mitigation of 
El-Zakzaky’s revolutionary rhetoric. It is certainly 
possible that the early involvement of Yusuf in 
El-Zakzaky’s organisation (at the time known as 
Muslim Brothers) left a psychological mark on 
him, and especially on his anti-establishment 
views. However, it is sufficient to browse through 
the many speeches and documents by Boko Haram 
leaders translated in the recent volume The Boko 
Haram Reader,31 to realise that at the theological 
and ideological levels, no trace of El-Zakzaky or 
other Shia sources remains in the movement we 
know today as Boko Haram. These speeches and 
documents, on the contrary, are literally replete 
with references drawn from the classical Salafi 
canon (from Ibn Taimiyya to Bin Baz) as well as, of 
course, from contemporary jihadi sources.
There is obviously a political (at the same 
time local and global) background to the recent 
wave of attempts to overstate the link between 
Yusuf and El-Zakzaky. In what appears to be a 
picture-perfect Girardian scenario,32 the internal 
pacification of the Muslim community of northern 
Nigeria, after the shock and the devastation of the 
Boko Haram crisis, has required the scapegoating 
of a victim. Only through this process has it been 
possible to establish a new social order, that is, the 
current pax Americana between former Al-Qaeda 
apologists turned icons of counter-radicalism, 
and faithful Saudi loyalists. In order to grasp the 
size that this macabre political ritual has taken, 
it is sufficient to remind the reader that little 
more than three years ago, hundreds of Shia 
members of the IMN were killed in a military 
operation prompted by the offense of causing 
public nuisance through illegal roadblocks,33 and 
that in spite of an order by the Nigerian Federal 
High Court prompting his release, El-Zakzaky 
has been jailed without trial since that day.34
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In arriving at a conclusion to this paper, I 
feel that, instead of falling into the classical War 
of Terror game and pitching El-Zakzaky against 
Ja‘far as the embodiment of a “good Islam” as 
opposed to a purported “bad Islam,” it is more 
fruitful to propose to look with simultaneous 
distance and empathy at the similarities shown 
by the trajectories of the two, when seen in a 
long-term perspective. While obviously divided 
by political and theological commitments, the 
life-trajectories of these two outstanding figures 
of contemporary northern Nigerian Islam display 
the characteristic features of a classic tragic hero, 
showing the potential and the limit of the utopias 
that they so passionately embraced.
At the beginning of their careers, Zakzaky and 
Ja‘far owed their fame not only to their intelligence 
and charisma, but also to the enthusiasm with which 
they embraced a global religious utopia, which they 
proposed to the northern Nigerian Muslim public as 
the simple solution to its specific, local predicament: 
under-development; educational backwardness; 
corruption; lack of credibility of the political 
leadership; and the like. For Zakzaky, this utopia 
was Iran and the Islamic Revolution. For Ja‘far, it 
was global Salafism and the University of Medina. 
Their respective utopias provided both Zakzaky 
and Ja‘far with a powerful platform to articulate a 
wholesome critique of their surrounding, Nigerian 
religious and political environment. Inevitably, 
however, tensions emerged when utopia and 
pragmatism, global canon and local context, started 
to pull each of the two figures in opposite directions 
at the same time.
At its core, Ja‘far’s ideal would probably have 
been to craft for himself a space in Nigeria as a 
reformist politico-Salafi à la Salman al-Ouda. 
Nigeria would have needed such a figure, but 
in times of War on Terror and of their political 
manipulations, politico-Salafis are often doomed 
to pay a high price. This is shown by the case of al-
Ouda himself who, after a brief co-optation in the 
Kingdom’s “counter-radicalisation” programmes, 
has become the victim of the aggressive Saudi 
campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood: today, 
al-Ouda is detained without trial, facing a call by his 
prosecutors for death penalty.35 Ja‘far’s embryonic 
vision, too, was soon crushed between, on the 
one hand, the extremism of his most idealistic 
students, who betrayed him to fully embrace Al-
Qaeda’s global jihad and, on the other hand, the 
diktats of Saudi (foreign and internal) policy, which 
imposed on the Kingdom’s scholars a religious ban 
on democracy and elections to counter the Muslim 
Brothers, and a simultaneous embrace of the War 
on Terror to please the American ally. According 
to Ja‘far’s long-time confidant Shaykh Ibrahim 
Khalil, during his last years before his tragic 
assassination, Ja‘far was constantly torn between 
a public that expected him to make statements 
more radical than he actually intended, and local 
and international mentors who pressured him in 
the opposite direction.36
As for El-Zakzaky, utopia showed him a tragic 
face for the first time in 1994. This was when some 
of the most radical members of his organisation, 
whose militant attitude he had helped to nurture, 
turned their backs on him after his embrace 
of Shiism became known to the public. On that 
occasion, he barely escaped a lynching attempt 
during a lecture at the campus of Bayero University, 
Kano. A second tragic turning point in Zakzaky’s 
career, less visible but of deeper implications, 
occurred after the emergence of an alternative 
Nigerian Shiism in the form of Nura Dass’s Rasulul 
A’zam Foundation, causing Zakzaky's IMN to 
experience a gradual marginalisation within the 
Nigerian Shia community that he had struggled 
so hard to establish. The gradual shift of the 
main object of Iranian patronage away from the 
revolutionary IMN towards the more pragmatic 
Rasulul A’zam Foundation, has been a discrete but 
significant aspect of the broader context preceding 
the crackdown of the Nigerian military forces on 
the IMN and the arrest of Zakzaky.37
The careers of Shaykh Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam 
and Shaykh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky show that utopias 
continue to have the power to shape the social 
imaginaries of outstanding individuals, but also 
that like a Roman Janus, glimmering utopias often 
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hide a second, tragic face. Nigerian Muslims will 
continue to create their future by negotiating 
between utopias and lived realities, and both 
Salafis and Shiites can play a positive role in this 
process. For this to happen, three steps seems 
to be necessary: (1) the Nigerian government 
should strive to relate to both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia (as well as Russia and the US) with cautious 
cordiality, carefully avoiding being turned into a 
new playground for Middle Eastern geo-politics 
and sectarian wars; (2) Zakzaky should be released 
and undergo a fair trial, while the IMN should be 
reintegrated into the wider Muslim community 
and allowed to contribute to the national debate 
(being also freely criticised by other Muslims when 
necessary); (3) the mainstream Nigerian Salafi 
leadership should undertake a honest process of 
clarification to its own public, of the tumultuous 
ideological shift of which it has been the theatre 
over the last two decades. I am sceptical that any 
of the above is bound to happen any time soon.
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In Search of a Plausible Theory 
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This paper is based on presentations made during 
an academic conference held in Kano city between 
13 and 15 November 2018. At this conference, 
scholars and experts from various parts of the 
world and from different disciplines deliberated 
on the topic “Insurgency and Boko Haram 
Phenomenon in Nigeria.” The conference offered 
me an opportunity to collect and analyse divergent 
views and discourses about Boko Haram, provided 
by academics with different biases. In this article, 
I draw from various papers presented as well as 
from post-presentation discussions, in order to 
examine various trajectories shaped by intellectual 
conversations on the Boko Haram phenomenon.
About seventy paper presentations were 
recorded during the conference but my analysis 
focuses mainly on the eight ‘lead papers’ for 
obvious reasons. While the leading papers were 
selected based on the conference theme, their 
contents were envisaged to make and drive new 
narrative(s) about the Boko Haram phenomenon. 
With this in mind, the scholars in the category of 
‘lead paper presenters’ were given adequate time 
to present in the plenary sessions and even more 
time for discussions. Although the other papers 
in the parallel sessions were equally important, 
only 10-15 minutes were allocated for both the 
presentation and discussions; this was a constraint 
when compared to 90 minutes allocated for each 
of the lead speakers in the plenary sessions. In 
total, the presenters of the lead papers accounted 
for half the time of the entire conference.
I also included in my analysis the views of 
some scholars such as Andrea Brigaglia, Roman 
Loimeier and Abdulbasit Kassim who did not 
participate in the conference. This is because the 
conference was partly a response to the school 
of thought represented by these three scholars. 
In the following section, I place discourses about 
Boko Haram into four categories. After discussing 
the main schools of thought in each of the 
categories, I present my own views about them in 
the summary and concluding section.
Four schools of thought in understanding the 
Boko Haram phenomenon
Apart from the political speeches by politicians 
during the inaugural session, there were 4 school 
of thoughts, as described below:
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1. According to the first school of thought, 
represented by Brigaglia, Loimeier and Kassim, 
Boko Haram is essentially a by-product of both 
global and localised Salafism.  For Brigaglia, in 
particular, the context created by the War on 
Terror also had a huge impact on the Nigerian 
Salafi arena that should be taken into account 
to understand the intra-Salafi conflict that led 
to the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
2. The second category is represented by those 
who are trying to alienate Boko Haram from 
global jihadi movements by treating it as an 
entity of its own that is to be explained mainly 
in terms of Nigeria's social, economic and 
political structures.
3. The third category, somehow related to the 
latter, is represented by those who are trying 
to deconstruct the theory linking Boko Haram 
to the Salafi movement in Nigeria and beyond.
4. The fourth category is represented by those 
who perceive Boko Haram as the product of 
an ideology that started in the early history 
of Muslims in northern Nigeria and beyond, 
which is ongoing and transforming in contexts 
and contents.2
The absence of the representatives of the first 
school of thought from the conference does not 
diminish the contributions of the participants 
in advancing our efforts in understanding 
the Boko Haram phenomenon. In fact, the 
trajectories emphasised during the conference 
have generated and would continue to generate 
further conversations that would add to our 
understanding of the Boko Haram phenomenon 
and other forms of Islamic radicalism in Nigeria. 
I summarise these trajectories below.
Boko Haram as a by-product of both global 
and localised Salafism 
Arguably, the most influential literature on 
the history of Boko Haram besides the works 
of Alexander Thurston, in terms of citations, is 
the one written by Andrea Brigaglia and Roman 
Loimeier. In 2012, Brigaglia wrote an article on 
the history of the Wahhabi da‘wa in West Africa 
focusing on the career and the murder of an 
influential Salafi scholar, Shaykh Ja'far Mahmoud 
Adam (d. 2007).3 He highlighted the close 
relationship between Shaykh Ja'far and the slain 
founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf. The 
latter was associated to the former and became a 
member of the Salafi movement before breaking 
away from him and starting his call against the 
Nigerian state. It is widely alleged that Shaykh 
Ja'far, who at a later stage harshly disagreed with 
Muhammad Yusuf’s ideology, was killed by one 
of the two groups headed either by Muhammad 
Yusuf or Muhammad Ali; the latter was a Sudan 
trained Salafi scholar and leader of the Taliban 
group of Kanamma. 
In 2015, Brigaglia wrote a thought-provoking 
article titled “The volatility of Salafi political 
theology, the war on terror and the genesis of 
Boko Haram.”4 In this piece, he linked Boko Haram 
to some influential writings and fatwas of Salafi 
scholars with international influence. 
In an August 2018 article, “ ‘Slicing off the 
Tumour’: The History of Global Jihad in Nigeria, 
as Narrated by the Islamic State,” Brigaglia 
consolidated his argument of linking Boko Haram 
ideology to global jihad and identified Boko 
Haram’s disagreements with the mainstream 
Nigerian Salafi group (also known as Izala5) as the 
fruit of the latter’s ambivalent messages on global 
jihad – on the one hand, supporting it outside 
Nigeria; on the other hand, repressing it inside 
the country.6
In the same vein, Roman Loimeier (2012) takes 
a historical approach, looking at Boko Haram as a 
movement that resulted from social, political and 
generational dynamics within the larger field of 
northern Nigerian radical Islam, as represented 
most prominently by the Izala movement.7 
According to Loimeier (2012: 142), membership 
of Izala entails “breaking with established society, 
including parents, and rejecting all manifestations 
of allegedly un-Islamic character (Arabic: bid‘a), 
including social customs such as the bride 
price, extensive mourning (Arabic: bika’), and 
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supererogatory prayers, often in the context of 
Sufi ritual.” According to Loimeier, this theological 
dimension of extremism and excommunication of 
other Muslims manifested in the dispute between 
Boko Haram and its Muslim opponents and 
represent the different stages of militant activity 
through which this movement has gone so far.
Later, Abdulbasit Kassim seemingly joined this 
school of thought with his 2015 article “Defining 
and Understanding the Religious Philosophy of 
jihādī-Salafism and the Ideology of Boko Haram.”8 
Kassim seems to follow Brigaglia in showing that 
the ideological foundation of Boko Haram lies 
in the history and transformation of Salafism in 
Nigeria.
The Kano conference, as mentioned by 
some of its organisers in a radio programme, 
was intended to respond to the first school of 
thought as espoused by Brigaglia, Loimeier and 
Kassim. According to the conference organisers, 
the narratives of those three scholars “are 
misrepresentations of facts against the local 
Salafi scholars” or Izala movement.9 Thus, based 
on the outcome of the conference presentations 
and discussions, I summarise the additional three 
trajectories below.
Boko Haram as a local terrorist organisation 
that emerged out of the local Muslim contexts
The second strand of argument, as mentioned 
earlier, is made of scholars who try to alienate 
the Boko Haram phenomenon from the global 
jihadi movement and who treat it as a local entity 
informed by local intrigues. Among the leading 
scholars who support this strand of argument, was 
Alexander Thurston, who was the first presenter 
in the plenary session of the Kano conference. 
His paper was titled “International Connections 
and Internal Disputes in Boko Haram.” Thurston 
posed some critical questions in his attempt to 
interrogate whether or not such connections exist. 
He specifically asked the following questions: Is 
Boko Haram local or global; and what types of 
contacts exist between Boko Haram and global 
jihadist after the 2009 uprising? If there is any 
contact, how does that relate to the internal 
dispute experienced by Boko Haram?10
Thurston is the author of a monograph on Boko 
Haram published in 201711 and of many thoughtful 
and influential articles on the topic.12 According to 
him, the debate about Boko Haram’s international 
connection “has been very very furious.” One side 
advanced the thesis that Boko Haram has been 
purely local, with no ties to the broader or global 
jihadi movement. In contrast, people on the other 
side of the debate argued that Boko Haram is 
merely an extension of al-Qaeda; that it has been 
so since its early years, and that it is now allied to 
the so-called Islamic State.
Thurston’s position aligns with the argument 
that Boko Haram is local although he acknowledges 
that some international connections have played 
important roles, especially whenever there were 
some serious struggles within Boko Haram. 
According to him, in order to understand which of 
the two theses presents a stronger case, we need 
to ask different questions about different periods 
of Boko Haram’s history. The first question is 
what role did al-Qaeda play in the genesis of Boko 
Haram? Do we date that role back to 2002 or to 
the 1990s? Secondly, in the case of the so-called 
Nigerian Taliban that emerged in 2003 in Yobe 
State, what roles were played by al-Qaeda and 
what role was played by the Nigerians connected 
to al-Qaeda, in generating the violence?13
According to Thurston, none of the sources 
that he has seen has linked Muhammad Yusuf, 
the founder of Boko Haram, to any international 
terrorist organisation. Some of the arguments 
trying to connect Boko Haram with al-Qaeda 
centre upon the role of Muhammad Ali al-
Barnawi; according to Thurston, however, not 
much is known about him. Some of the sources 
mention that he studied in Sudan and had contact 
with Bin Laden when the latter was there; that he 
received money and returned home to start a jihad 
movement in Nigeria. However, Thurston pointed 
out that there are many conflicting accounts, 
even from the Boko Haram sources, about the 
relationship between Muhammad Ali al-Barnawi 
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and Muhammad Yusuf; thus, it is not certain 
whether they were friends or enemies. These 
contradictions extend to the role of Muhammad Ali 
in the formation of Boko Haram. Therefore, in the 
absence of hard evidence to establish connections 
between the Nigerian Taliban and the global jihadi 
movement, one is left with no choice but to accept 
the position that the Nigerian Taliban in Yobe 
State was merely a local movement.14
The third period that requires questions is the 
time after the uprising of 2009, which was after 
Abubakar Shekau took over the movement. Thus, 
what kinds of contacts exist between Boko Haram 
and global jihadi movements, and how much 
have those contacts changed the trajectories of 
Boko Haram and Abubakar Shekau in particular? 
Thurston stated that he has not come across any 
sources showing that AQIM or al-Qaeda played a 
role in the 2009 uprising. Whenever sources from 
al-Qaeda talked about Abubakar Shekau, they did 
so by observing from a distance. Thus, he took 
the position that Boko Haram was born as a local 
terrorist organisation with no links to any other 
organisation beyond Nigeria.15
However, after the 2011 suicide bombing of the 
UN office in Abuja, the Nigerian government, the 
US government, some analysts, and journalists 
started to consider the possibility that external 
organisations such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabab may 
have played a role in transforming Boko Haram. 
The problem, according to Thurston, is that 
researchers could not go beyond the statements 
of the government officials and journalists to 
prove the possible ties between Boko Haram and 
other external organisations. Based on the lack 
of evidence during this period, Thurston took 
the position that Boko Haram was, for most of its 
history, a purely local phenomenon.16
Thurston mentioned that the situation began 
to change in 2015 when the Boko Haram leader, 
Abubakar Shekau, pledged allegiance to an 
external organisation, ISIS, under Abubakar al-
Baghdadi. Earlier on, when Osama Bin Laden 
was killed in Pakistan, many documents were 
recovered from his house in Pakistan. Among 
them was a letter that Abubakar Shekau had sent 
to the central command of al-Qaeda, around 2009 
or 2010, asking Bin Laden’s permission to join his 
al-Qaeda network. According to Thurston, there is 
no evidence to prove that this attempt to establish 
a working relationship was successful because 
there was no indication whether Bin Laden had 
responded.  If he had indeed responded, there 
was no evidence whether he agreed or not. This 
gap is yet to be filled. There is also another leaked 
document showing that Abubakar Shekau has 
sent a letter to AQIM requesting them to provide 
communication training and money to them. 
In both cases, one could also ask the question 
of how were Shekau’s epistles able to reach 
Osama Bin Laden and AQIM, if no links existed 
between the Nigerian jihadi leader and his global 
counterparts.17
However, Thurston referred to more recent 
evidence suggesting the existence of correspon-
dence between Boko Haram and global jihadists, 
particularly Boko Haram dissidents, who were 
unhappy with Abubakar Shekau’s leadership. 
This correspondence should, however, be 
understood within the context of the period when 
it was produced. The first of those documents was 
released by AQIM and entitled “Legal Advice and 
Guidance from Shaykh Abul Hassan Rashid to the 
Mujahidin in Nigeria.” The second was an essay 
released in 2018 by al-Barnawi’s faction of Boko 
Haram and was titled “Removing the Tumour of 
Shekau’s Khawarij through Paying Allegiance to 
the People of Generosity.” According to Thurston, 
the transnational ties were more important to 
second-tier leaders, suggesting that Boko Haram 
was purely a local movement while its international 
connections, which started at a later stage, are not 
directly connected to its origin.18
The last item of correspondence suggesting 
international links between Boko Haram and 
other jihadi organisations was written when Boko 
Haram were pushed back by the military operation 
carried out by the armed forces of Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger. At that time, some 
Boko Haram members expressed the view that 
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Shekau was too authoritarian and there was a need 
to find a better leader in the person of Abu Musab 
al-Barnawi. After considering all the evidence at 
his disposal, Thurston restated his position that 
Boko Haram is purely a local organisation that 
established international connections at a later 
stage of its history. 19
Thurston concluded his presentation and 
strengthened his position by drawing a comparison 
between Boko Haram’ leadership and that of 
other terrorist groups in North Africa and Asia. 
He pointed out that the difference between Boko 
Haram and other movements is that the former 
is run locally by local leaders and with local 
membership. In contrast, both the leadership and 
membership of a movement such as Al-Qaeda in 
the Maghrib (AQIM) are international. Thus, their 
leaders and members come from across the globe; 
for example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Afghanistan, 
Somalia and Egypt. On the contrary, Boko Haram 
is 90 percent local with a 10 percent international 
influence only manifesting itself at a later stage of 
its history.
The debate that followed Thurston’s presen-
tation was very lively. While some participants, 
especially the conference organisers agreed 
with him, many respondents, mostly Nigerians, 
disagree about the claim that Boko Haram is 
purely local. They also challenged the veracity 
of his approach of treating Boko Haram as an 
independent entity, in view of the cross-border 
attacks and the different nationalities of Boko 
Haram members arrested in Nigeria. Thurston 
responded that he does not consider Nigeriens, 
Malians, Chadians, and Cameroonians to be 
foreigners as they belong to the same Chad basin 
region. In the middle of the heated discussions 
following Thurston’s presentation, Muhammad 
Kyari made the valid intervention that “Boko 
Haram is a local organisation with international 
appropriation.” Appropriation in its artistic 
form entails taking something from another 
source and changing it in ways that will suit the 
appropriator’s need. Thus, this debate is yet to 
be settled.
Boko Haram and other violent extremism as 
rooted in the Iranian Revolution of 1979
The third school of thought, which was ably 
represented at  the conference, is the one trying 
to deconstruct the theories linking Boko Haram to 
the Salafi movement in Nigeria and beyond. This 
trajectory was captured in the second lead paper 
presented by Salisu Shehu from Bayero University, 
Kano. In his paper,20 Shehu started with providing 
the idea that “Boko Haram is a phenomenon that 
has undergone some kinds of metamorphosis.” It 
began as a da‘wa (preaching) organisation; then 
transformed into a “rag-tag militia group”; and 
eventually grew into an international terrorist 
organisation. 
The main questions Shehu addressed through 
his paper were as follows: how does the ‘aqida 
(doctrine) of Boko Haram/Halal start; at what 
points has it transformed; and who is responsible 
for this transformation? He mentioned that his 
answers to these questions were based on the 
existing literature which he reviewed before 
stating his position. The literature on Boko Haram 
keeps increasing, and its emphasis changing, 
but the main emphasis of early literature was a 
debate about whether Boko (modern, western-
style education) is halal (Islamically permissible) 
or haram (Islamically impermissible). This debate 
should, however, be understood in the framework 
of different periods and their contexts. What is 
common to all these periods vis-à-vis the doctrine 
of Boko Haram is the presence of what he termed 
“value conflicts” which led to the declaration of 
Boko (western education/civilisation) as haram. 
The conflict led to the crisis facing “our traditional 
education system” and is evident in how “Quranic 
and Islamic schools are disorganised,” said 
Shehu.21
Moving onwards, Shehu mentioned that 
contemporary narratives about Boko Haram do 
not capture some crucial segments in the history of 
extremism and radicalism in Nigeria.  He cited the 
works of some prolific writers about Boko Haram, 
specifically Loimeier, Brigaglia, Kyari and Kassim. 
Shehu reported that he has read their works, 
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which, according to him, tend to depart from 
“the current bus stop — that is the relationship 
between Salafism, extremism, and militancy.” In 
response to this hiatus, Shehu claimed that it is 
not possible to talk about Islamic radicalisation in 
Nigeria without mentioning the role of Iran after 
the 1979 Islamic revolution. Although radicalism 
started earlier through Zakzaky’s Muslim 
Brotherhood’s “Islam only” slogan, the Iranian 
Revolution was the catalyst, because there was a 
marriage of convenience between the Nigerian MB 
led by Ibrahim Zakzaky and the Islamic revolution 
ideology, when the latter was officially exported 
from Iran to other parts of the world, including 
Nigeria.22
According to Shehu, Ibrahim Zakzaky, the 
leader of a Shiite group evolved from the Nigerian 
MB and known today as the Islamic Movement 
of Nigeria (IMN), can be regarded as the first 
proclaimer and advocate of Boko Haram in a 
radical sense; in other words, in the sense of a 
rebellion against the constituted authority and the 
Nigerian state. According to him, radicalisation 
started when the Zakzakiya23 brainwashed Muslim 
students into withdrawing from universities 
and urging them not to take part in the National 
Youth Service Corps (NYSC).24 He mentioned that 
this radicalisation by the Zakzakiyya culminated 
in the Funtua Declaration, when Zakzaky “openly 
declared an uncompromising rebellion against 
the Nigerian state.” Since then, followers of the 
Zakzakiya movement started confrontations with 
armed Nigerian security agents. According to 
Shehu, many Boko Haram members were inspired 
by the Zakzakiya and the Islamic Movement of 
Nigeria (IMN). This scenario, according to Shehu, 
has never been mentioned, especially in the 
writings of Roman Loimeier on Boko Haram.25
Shehu stated that the issue of withdrawal from 
politics, as emphasised by Brigaglia (2018),26 is 
“totally unconnected with Izala.”27 He mentioned 
that while Zakzaky was promoting bara’a (re-
bellion), Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gummi, a 
prominent leader in the Izala movement, enjoined 
his followers to influence change by joining 
government security formations (military and 
police), as well as by active participation in politics 
rather than withdrawing from them on religious 
grounds. Thus, Shaykh Gummi founded the slogan 
a shiga a gyara, a Hausa phrase that can loosely 
be translated as “join to change.” In contrast, 
Zakzaky coined the contrasting slogan of a shiga 
a narke bara’a ita ce mafita, which could loosely be 
translated as “if you join you become like them; 
withdrawal is the best option.”28
Shehu added that since Boko Haram began, the 
verbal intellectual responses to their doctrine came 
from Shaykh Ja'far Mahmud Adam (died 2007), 
Shaykh Auwal Albani Zaria (died 2011), as well as 
Shaykh Dr. Isa Ali Pantami, Shaykh Abdulwahab 
Abdallah, and Dr. Mansur Isa Yelwa, all of whom are 
[or were] prominent scholars with Salafi affinity. 
According to Shehu, the “written intellectual 
response to Boko Haram has been very minimal 
and the little done was by the Da‘wa Cooperation 
Council and Da‘wa Institute of Nigeria,” both of 
which are Salafi-based organisations.
This trajectory was supported in many other 
presentations at the conference, notably “From 
Zakzakiya movement to Boko Haram: The 
history of Muhammad Yusuf’s journey to violent 
extremism” by Abdullahi Lamido.29 In the same 
context, there were similar presentations that 
defined Boko Haram as Kharijites vis-à-vis the 
mainstream Muslims. This trend of using the label 
of Kharijites has become controversial because 
some mainstream Muslims use it to condemn Boko 
Haram, but the latter uses it as well to condemn 
its various splinter groups. One such example 
is the recent (2018) treatise released by the al-
Barnawi group, which labels Shekau’s group as 
Kharijites.30
The papers presented by Dr Bashir Aliyu Umar 
(titled “Insurgency and the abuse of the concept of 
jihad”) and by Dr Muhammad Sani Umar Rijiyar-
Lemu titled (“The position of Muslim scholars 
on violent conflicts and transgressions”) were 
based on the same line of argument that seeks to 
deconstruct the viewpoint linking Boko Haram 
and other global Salafi-jihadi movements.31 The 
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scope of Dr Bashir Aliyu Umar’s presentation was 
as broad and complex as the concepts he dealt 
with: jihad, takfir, darul hijra, darul harb and al-
wala' wal-bara' etc., discussed with references to 
the works of both theologians and academics. 
Dr Umar discussed the verses and hadiths that 
insurgents (non-state actors who have taken up 
arms) use in advancing their cause. According 
to him, the matter of jihad is not everybody’s 
concern. He cited Ibn Taymiyyah in the Fatawa al-
kubra, who wrote that only one category of people 
out of three is supposed to talk or give fatwa about 
it. Those are:
the people of upright and sound 
religion who also have deep aware-
ness of the affairs of the people of the 
world.” He said “but as for the people 
of the world who do have some 
acquaintance with matters of religion 
or the people of religion who do not 
have any acquaintance with matters 
of the world, it is not their business to 
delve into the field of jihad.32
According to Umar, jihad entails the spilling of 
blood, which goes against one of the fundamental 
objectives of Islam: protection of life. The latter is 
so sacred that it is sometimes given prominence 
over the protection of religion. So, if jihad entails 
spilling the blood of the fighter and the one who 
is fought, then declaring and waging it is a very 
serious matter. Umar tried to highlight that it is 
the erroneous interpretation of the Quranic verses 
and hadiths on jihad that led to the current state. 
Umar pointed out that some ulama have become 
victims of their emotions by issuing fatwas that 
were wrong, such as those claiming the legality of 
suicide bombing. While he condemned most of the 
interpretations made by the jihadi groups about 
those verses, he pointed out that jihadis all over 
the world have made a declaration which they 
have turned into aqa’id (principle of fiqh) about 
making fatwas on jihad. That declaration is la 
yufti qa‘idun li-mujahid, meaning “the one who has 
stayed behind without going out to fight, is not 
entitled to give a fatwa to the one who has gone 
out to fight a jihad.” This principle is based on the 
Quranic verse that states, “those who stay behind 
are not the same as those who go out to fight in 
the cause of Allah;”33 thus, the former is not in the 
position to give fatwa to the latter. The Jihadis also 
cite a statement credited to Imam Ahmad when 
he was asked: “What is the best way for you to 
memorise hadith?” He replied: “Practice it.” Based 
on this, anybody wanting to know about jihad 
and becoming a scholar of jihad should practice 
jihad. Thus, only people who practice jihad would 
understand what it is and give fatwa about it. This 
misconception, according to Dr. Bashir is one of 
the greatest crimes against jihad. He argues that 
with the notable exception of Shaykh Abdallah 
Azzam, most of the jihadi ideologues are not 
trained Islamic scholars. They are specialists in 
different disciplines who delved into jihad and 
give fatwas about it. He gave the examples of 
Muhammad Abdulsalam Faraj who was a graduate 
of engineering, Osama Bin Laden (an economist) 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri (a surgeon). According 
to Dr. Bashir, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was a 
scholar of usul (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) 
and later became an ideologue of ISIS; as such, he 
is also out of the mainstream ulama.
The bottom line, as expressed during the 
discussion session, was that some verses about jihad 
are clear. One of the delegates to the conference 
pointed out that the meanings of some of the verses 
used by the jihadists are unambiguous. However, 
where the meanings of verses are ambiguous, 
controversial interpretations were made by 
scholars such as Ibn Taimiyya. The interventions 
made by Dr. Bashir Aliyu Umar, Professor Salisu 
Shehu and Malam Nuru Lemu were that the 
contexts under which some of those fatwas were 
made, justified them. However, whenever the 
context changes, then the perspectives of the 
ulama and their fatwas may also change. 
To summarise: there is no monopoly on the 
subjective interpretations of religious texts. 
While everybody attending the conference 
seemed to agree that the interpretations by the 
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jihadis are wrong, it should be noted that Boko 
Haram members believe that the interpretations 
of Malaman Gwamnati (ulama working for 
emirates, kingdoms, and governments) or those 
who gathered at the conference (including the 
mainstream Salafi ulama) are also erroneous.
Boko Haram ideology as cutting across 
different ideological divides
The fourth school of thought is represented 
mainly, but not exclusively, by historians of 
religion looking at the history of Boko Haram 
as a product of an ideology that started in 
early Islamic history, but which is ongoing and 
transforming in both contexts and contents. 
One example reflecting this school of thought 
was a third lead paper presented by Professor 
Kyari Muhammad and titled “Historicising the 
Boko Haram phenomenon.”34 Kyari made an 
authoritative statement to the effect that history 
is written in the language of the victors, meaning 
that narratives and discourses about Boko Haram 
are constructed in favour of the speaking subject. 
Although the jihad of Usmanu Dan Fodio was the 
main jihad that challenged the state successfully in 
Nigerian history, there were attempts by earlier or 
later jihadists which were not successful. He gave 
an example of Rabeh and his reign of terror in the 
old Bornu empire in the name of jihad, during the 
late nineteenth / early twentieth centuries. 
However, the current ideology of Boko Haram 
in the Nigerian context started, continued Kyari, 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
people in northern Nigeria, including the emirs, 
perceived the colonial project and Boko (western 
education) as two sides of the same coin. To avoid 
both, many people embarked on hijra (migration) 
toward the east with the ultimate aim of reaching 
Mecca. Kyari gave the example of Attahiru Ahmadu 
and his followers, who migrated to Sudan to avoid 
the invasion of their Islamic land by the British, 
as well as to unite with other parts of the Muslim 
umma. Ahmadu was, however, killed on his way. 
Even as far back as then, there were fatwas to 
the effect that whoever kills a European will go 
to heaven.  These were similar to the ideologies 
or fatwa of the contemporary jihadis within Boko 
Haram.
The Europeans were also not innocent. During 
colonialization, they deliberately excluded from 
government service anybody educated in the 
traditional religious system. Thus, people who 
memorised Quran and could read and write in 
Arabic but did not hold a certificate could not be 
employed. This practice, which prevailed until 
the present time, has compounded the situation. 
Thus, the activities of contemporary Boko Haram 
fighters, for Kyari, are not new, and Muhammad 
Yusuf (the founder) and his subordinates have 
built upon the dominant narratives about jihad, 
Islamic state, and western education to win the 
sympathy of many people. 
One notable feature in the discussions at the 
conference related to the issues of climate change 
and poverty. Many people agreed that those two 
issues are the catalysts of the Boko Haram menace. 
A third issue that most of the discussions avoided, 
because of its religious sensitivity, was that of 
population explosion; both Emir Muhammadu 
Sanusi II and Professor Salisu Shehu, however, 
described this as a time bomb which, when 
exploded, would be more devastating than the 
current Boko Haram.
Summary and conclusions
Competing discourses about the Boko Haram 
insurgency are characterised by different con-
ceptions and contextualisation of how the ideology 
of violent extremism is nurtured and spread 
in Nigeria. One prominent point of contention 
is whether its origin lies in Salafism or ‘other 
movements.’ There is an established school of 
thought (represented by Andrea Brigaglia, Roman 
Loimeier, and Abdulbasit Kassim), according 
to which the Boko Haram ideology is rooted in 
Salafism and connected to global jihad. 
The Kano conference arose from the need, 
felt by some scholars, to respond to this school 
of thought. During that conference, three 
other schools of thought were emphasised. 
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These include the one expounded by Alexander 
Thurston who is of the view that Boko Haram is 
a local movement that developed international 
connections comparatively recently, when the 
Nigerian government was about to defeat them 
militarily. Consequently, its members started 
having internal leadership disputes and both the 
main body and splinter groups within Boko Haram 
started reaching out to external jihadi movements 
for support.
According to the third school of thought, 
movements other than Salafism and countries 
other than Saudi Arabia are responsible for 
the rise of Boko Haram. For the proponents of 
this view, the Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria, 
which derived its inspiration from its Egyptian 
counterpart, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria 
(also called Zakzakiya), which is an offshoot of the 
Iranian Revolution, established the foundation of 
religious militancy in Nigeria and paved the way 
for the Boko Haram insurgency. 
According to the fourth school of thought, 
Boko Haram is the product of the combination 
of universal jihad ideology, Mahdism (mille-
narianism), as well as injustices of the colonial 
and postcolonial systems. The history of religious 
rebellion against the state predates the jihad of 
Usmanu dan Fodio. This was compounded by 
the British occupation of northern Nigeria and 
made worse by the injustices suffered by common 
people at the hands of the western-educated elites 
of postcolonial Nigeria. 
I do not subscribe to the idea of isolating Boko 
Haram from other global jihadi movements. 
The reason for this viewpoint is that, since the 
importation of various brands of Islam to Nigeria 
from the Maghrib and Middle East, the people 
of these regions have maintained for centuries 
physical contacts and scholarly exchanges in 
various forms. The regional boundaries that we 
impose are more imaginary than real, and have 
no effect on most Islamic actors, especially on 
those involved in the propagation of global jihad. 
This became clear during the conference from the 
responses of many attendees and contributors, 
to the idea of creating a boundary between, for 
example, the plight of the Palestinians and the 
reaction of Nigerian Muslims who feel connected 
to the global Muslim umma. 
Similarly, I observe some shortcomings in 
the attempts by those scholars who regard Boko 
Haram as being exclusively a product of Salafism, 
as well as by those trying to dissociate the latter 
with Boko Haram completely. The discussion on 
Boko Haram during the conference revealed the 
difficulties that arose whenever an attempt was 
made to treat the Boko Haram ideology differently 
from the activities of its members and their 
complex networking beyond a particular sect. In 
the process, some of the conference organisers 
have become victims of the same mistake they 
were criticising the first school of thought of. In 
my opinion, we should not seek to understand 
Boko Haram as being a separate entity, entirely 
independent from the body of texts that drive the 
(global) jihadi ideology and its various trajectories 
that produce local jihadis. For example, while there 
is synergy, in many ways, between those scholars 
who treat Boko Haram as a local rather than a global 
jihad movement and those who separate Salafism 
from Boko Haram, I find contradistinctions in 
their cases. The arguments of the latter group, in 
fact, seem to be also underpinned by an attempt 
to internationalise Boko Haram. Thus, many 
papers in the conference, while attempting to 
de-emphasise the links between Boko Haram 
and global Salafism,  insisted on linking it with 
Zakzaky’s Shiism and the agency of Iran. Similarly, 
this group of scholars attempts to show the abuse 
of the concept of jihad and debunks the erroneous 
interpretation of some verses by the local and 
global jihadi groups. In these attempts, however, 
they also inevitably drive attention to the “dotted 
lines” that seem to connect Boko Haram and 
global jihadi movements to common sources of 
interpretation, thus paradoxically (and perhaps 
unintendedly) reinforcing the views of Brigaglia, 
Loimeier and Kassim. In other words, while 
Thurston tried to alienate Boko Haram from the 
rest of the transnational jihadi movements, Shehu 
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traced the history of radicalisation of its founder 
Muhammad Yusuf to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Zakzakiya Movement which have their roots 
in Egypt and Iran respectively. In the same vein, 
Umar’s submission connected all jihadi groups 
worldwide, by pointing out how they receive their 
inspirations from one source: the “erroneous” 
interpretations of Quranic texts by their global 
jihadi leaders and fatwa-givers.
Thus, based on this observation, I come to the 
conclusion that the papers of Shehu and writers 
with similar views commit the same mistake they 
accused their counterparts of doing; in other 
words, singling out a particular sect or movement. 
And in doing so, they end up coming closer to the 
school of thought they seek to oppose, because 
they both emphasise the links between Boko 
Haram and global jihadism, the main difference 
relating to whether the inspiration supposedly 
came from Saudi Arabia’s Salafism or from Iran’s 
Shiism. I regard myself as an external observer, 
observing from a distance and without having been 
drawn into the Sufi, Salafi, and Shia theological 
conundrum among the academia. As such, my 
viewpoint is that all the key players in nurturing 
and spreading violent extremism in Nigeria are 
the product of the same religious system that 
has existed for centuries. As aptly captured by 
Muhammad Kyari, all Islamic sects or movements 
(in the categories of Sufi, Izala, and Shia), as well 
as individuals or groups of ulama in Nigeria, 
have appropriated the jihad of Usman dan Fodio 
in one way or another in ways that benefit their 
respective agendas. This is in addition to the fact 
that all contemporary Salafis, including those who 
reinvigorated the jihadi ideology, or the Sharia 
system in the late 1990s, are former members of 
the Sufi brotherhoods, just as some members of 
Boko Haram are disenchanted members of the 
Izala/Salafi movement.
These shortcomings, in my view, make the 
fourth school of thought stronger. Those scholars 
regard Boko Haram as the product of activities of 
different movements that predate the nineteenth-
century jihad in what is today known as northern 
Nigeria. The history of Islamically motivated 
religious insurgencies in Nigeria is a long one, 
that passed through various stages such as the 
jihad of Usman dan Fodio, Mahdism, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Salafi movement in Nigeria, the 
Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and many other 
overlapping trends. All of these movements 
have gradually transformed the idea of religious 
insurgency against the state into what we are 
discussing today as the Boko Haram phenomenon. 
Moreover, as ‘Islam’ (I am not sure if this is the 
right term to use here) or the sources of Islamic 
ideas are universal, the ideologies of these 
movements are also inevitably universal, but with 
local appropriations. All these movements share 
the identifier Islam even though the members, 
their activities and their different narratives have 
kept changing. These changes are in response to 
internal influences as well as external influences 
from Middle Eastern countries (specifically 
Saudi Arabia and Iran) on the one hand, and the 
western world on the other. In other words, the 
contemporary northern Nigerian culture, of which 
religious extremism is a significant component, 
is a product of information or knowledge that 
is organised and transmitted to its consumers 
(religious subjects) in such a way that it benefits 
the political interest of the region’s colonisers, 
regardless of whether these be Saudi Arabia, Iran 
or the West. This activity takes place through 
the coloniser’s ‘covert agents,’ in other words, 
religious leaders or intellectuals of all kinds.
Finally, I accept that proffering solutions to 
Boko Haram and other violent extremism is a very 
complex matter and beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, I see a danger in framing discourses that 
exclude or single out specific groups in charting 
a course out of the associated difficulties. The 
exclusionary approach suggested by some of the 
scholars who contributed to the discourses35 at the 
conference could create the danger of reinforcing 
a vicious circle where marginal groups are 
pitted against the dominant one. Already, we are 
observing increased animosity between Muslim 
ideological groups such as Salafis against Sufis and 
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the majority Sunni against minority Shia and/or 
vice versa. This portends the danger of aggravating 
the situation to a full blown intra-religious crisis 
– a replica of what is happening in other Muslim 
majority societies. Thus, I do not subscribe to the 
exclusionary approach, whatever form it might 
take, as a way of countering ‘others.’ I feel that the 
way out for our communities is to teach tolerance 
not only between different Muslim groups but 
also towards non-Muslims, including Christians 
and followers of traditional religions. After all, we 
all share the same land called Nigeria, northern 
Nigeria or any other geographical identifier.
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